التقصير واللاّمسؤوليّة من قِبَل السلطات في نظر الخبراء: عدم التعاطي بجدّية مع المشكلة
“In its actions and policies, the U.S. government does not treat the danger of covert NBC aggression as a first-order national security challenge, occasional rhetoric aside. There are critical deficiencies in the current U.S. capacity to cope with the covert NBC threat. Important high-leverage policy areas currently receive insufficient attention and funding”2.
“The overall U.S. policy response to the problem of NBC terrorism and covert attack has been inadequate in comparison to the importance of the threat”3.
“More research is needed on ways to detect, disable, and mitigate the effects of WMD. The U.S. National Laboratories have vast research capabilities that, because of inadequate funding, are not being fully exploited… To combat nuclear terrorism, funding is needed to improve and implement nuclear forensics capabilities and to improve the detection of nuclear materials”8.
“The Num-Lugar-Domenici amendment was a vital first step in the U.S. effort to address the problem of domestic or terrorist NBC attack, but further efforts will be needed if the United States is to reduce its vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. In particular, the funding base of the domestic preparedness programs is insufficient to achieve the objective sought by Congress, and the Department of Defense is not fully committed to this mission”9.
The Num-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, which was unanimously passed by the Senate in July 1996, “assigned responsibility to the nation’s domestic preparedness against domestic NBC incidents to the Department of Defense. The law directed the president to take immediate action “to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction” and “to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and the local level”10.
“To begin meeting this objective [improving the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies], Congress provided approximately $50 million in supplemental funding to the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1997”11. This is a very small amount when we remember that the yearly defense budget for the United States is not less than $300 billion12.
According to the experts, any vigorous and balanced action against the covert NBC threat “requires expenditures in domains that have traditionally had little if anything to do with the military, such as first-responder preparedness and epidemiological surveillance. The congressional committees concerned with national security are protective of the defense budget, and many legislators (and generals and admirals) are reflexively opposed to using the defense budget for purposes outside of traditional military missions…Politicians still struggle more to preserve existing projects that benefit their constituents than to find new ones that necessitate compensatory offsets in the federal budget”13.
“NEST’s ability to deal with the full range of terrorist nuclear devices was limited and funding was inadequate”15.
“The government is similarly unprepared to deal with acts of chemical or biological terrorism… While the U.S. government is attempting to improve its ability to respond to chemical and biological incidents, its efforts to date have been “problematic” and the effectiveness of the programs is ‘uncertain’”16.
“An array of federal, state, and local government agencies possess capabilities that are relevant to countering the covert NBC threat, but there is no overarching strategy, and no coherent organizational structure, for pulling these disparate capabilities together to meet the challenge posed by the possible covert use of weapons of mass destruction”19.
“The United States has no coherent national strategy for dealing with the covert nuclear, biological, or chemical threat. No agency in the U.S. government is currently required or equipped to conduct the strategic planning across multiple jurisdictional boundaries that is necessary to reduce U.S. vulnerability to covert NBC aggression… This issue, however, is not presently a high-level priority of the U.S. government, and is likely to become one only if a domestic NBC attack occurs”20.
“U.S. government agencies maintain at least twelve databases related to WMD terrorism. But agencies rarely disseminate their findings. Often they are unaware of their counterparts’ efforts, and the same data are collected twice (or more than twice). Worse still, there is no analysis of worldwide terrorism that includes both domestic and international terrorism. Efforts to share data internationally are also inadequate”21.
“The most comprehensive analysis of trends in terrorism is performed by the CIA. But the CIA, claiming inadequate funding, has not made a serious effort [to analyze the data]…If the U.S. government is to have any hope of predicting and preventing WMD terrorism, these data must be analyzed properly. Moreover, the costs of analysis are minimal; it is a waste of the taxpayers’ money to gather data and then leave it analyzed”22.
“Of particular concern was the difficulty of cooperation between agencies whose priorities and incentives occasionally conflict”23.
“Sharing within our responsible agencies is far more important than separate credit or budget enhancements. We cannot afford to have the FBI deny the CIA information it has obtained, or the CIA to deny the FBI the information it has.”24
The FBI is “a highly self-contained bureaucracy and is notoriously reluctant to share information with other government agencies”26.
“All these factors combine to make the FBI poorly suited for the role of planning and implementing a broad-based U.S. program for combating the full range of possible covert NBC threats. The basic weakness of PDD-39 [Presidential Decision Directive] is that…it gives responsibility for managing the important task of improving U.S. response capabilities to the wrong agency [FBI]”27.
2. Falkenrath, page 261
3. Falkenrath, page 261
4. Falkenrath, page 337
5. Falkenrath, page 338
6. Falkenrath, page 339
7. Stern, pages 128-129
8. Stern, page 158
9. Falkenrath, page 263
10. Falkenrath, page 262
11. Falkenrath, page 262
12. See Stern, page 3
13. Falkenrath, page 338
14. Stern, page 129
15. Stern, page 141
16. Stern, page 141
17. Falkenrath, page 274
18. Falkenrath, page 274
19. Falkenrath, page 261
20. Falkenrath, pages 264-265
21. Stern, page 139
22. Stern, page 139
23. Stern, page 140
24. Heymann, p.156
25. Falkenrath, page 272
26. Falkenrath, page 273
27. Falkenrath, page 273